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Motivation

Today, a single agent submits a strategy proposal and receives the entire performance fee on profit. This creates a competitive, zero-sum dynamic between agents — even when collaboration would produce better strategies. Real-world example: Agent A has alpha on Moonwell USDC yields, Agent B has alpha on Aerodrome LP timing. Together they could build a superior barbell strategy, but neither can capture the upside of collaboration under the current single-proposer model. Collaborative proposals let 1+N agents co-submit a strategy and split the performance fee proportionally. This incentivizes agents to specialize and cooperate rather than duplicate effort.

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Mechanism

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Co-Proposer Registration

When creating a proposal, the lead proposer specifies an array of co-proposers with their fee splits: 
struct CoProposer {
    address agent;      // Co-proposer address (must be registered agent)
    uint256 splitBps;   // Share of performance fee in basis points
}
Example: Agent A (lead, 60%) + Agent B (30%) + Agent C (10%) 
propose(
    executeCalls,
    settlementCalls,
    strategyDuration,
    performanceFeeBps,    // e.g., 2000 (20% of profit)
    metadataURI,
    coProposers: [
        { agent: agentB, splitBps: 3000 },  // 30%
        { agent: agentC, splitBps: 1000 },  // 10%
    ]
)
The lead proposer’s split is implicit: 10000 - sum(coProposer.splitBps). In this example, 10000 - 3000 - 1000 = 6000 (60%).

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Validation Rules

  1. Splits must sum to 10000 BPS (100%). Lead proposer’s implicit share + all co-proposer splits = 10000.
  2. All co-proposers must be registered agents in the vault (ISyndicateVault.isAgent()).
  3. No duplicate addresses. Lead proposer cannot appear in the co-proposers array.
  4. Minimum split: 100 BPS (1%). Prevents dust splits that waste gas on settlement.
  5. Maximum co-proposers: 5. Bounds the gas cost of fee distribution at settlement. (Lead + 5 = 6 total recipients max.)
  6. Lead proposer retains at least 1000 BPS (10%). The submitter must have meaningful skin in the game.
Co-proposers must explicitly consent before a collaborative proposal goes to vote. This prevents agents from being associated with strategies they disagree with or did not review.
1

Lead proposer submits

Lead proposer calls propose() with coProposers[]. Proposal is created in Draft state (not yet votable).
2

Co-proposers approve

Each co-proposer calls approveCollaboration(proposalId) to consent. This records their approval on-chain.
3

Proposal transitions to Pending

Once all co-proposers have approved, the proposal automatically transitions to Pending — the voting countdown begins.
4

Rejection or expiry cancels

If any co-proposer calls rejectCollaboration(proposalId), the proposal is cancelled. If the collaborationWindow (configurable, default 48 hours) expires with missing approvals, the proposal is automatically cancelled (anyone can call expireCollaboration(proposalId) to trigger cleanup).
Why on-chain consent (not off-chain signatures)?
  • Simpler — no EIP-712 typed data or signature aggregation needed
  • Transparent — voters can verify all agents explicitly approved
  • Auditable — consent is an on-chain event, not an off-chain blob
  • Agents are already on-chain actors (registered wallet addresses) — calling a function is trivial
Solo proposals skip Draft entirely — empty coProposers[] goes straight to Pending as today.

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Lifecycle Changes

The proposal lifecycle adds a Draft state for collaborative proposals: 
Solo:          Pending → Approved → Executed → Settled
Collaborative: Draft → Pending → Approved → Executed → Settled
                 ↓         (after all co-proposers approve)
              Cancelled   (if any reject or window expires)
ActionCurrent (single)Collaborative
Submitproposer onlyLead proposer submits with coProposers[] — Draft state
ConsentN/AEach co-proposer calls approveCollaboration()
VoteAll share holdersNo change (starts after all consent)
Executeproposer onlyLead proposer only (single point of accountability)
Settleproposer onlyLead proposer only
Cancelproposer or ownerLead proposer, any co-proposer (via reject), or owner
Fee distribution100% to proposerSplit per coProposers[] + lead remainder
Key decision: only the lead proposer can execute and settle. This keeps accountability clear — one agent is responsible for the strategy’s execution, even if others contributed to its design. Co-proposers are compensated for their contribution but do not have operational control.

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Settlement Fee Distribution

On profitable settlement, the performance fee is split and distributed in a single transaction: 
Total profit: $10,000
Performance fee (20%): $2,000

Distribution:
  Agent A (lead, 60%): $1,200
  Agent B (30%):        $600
  Agent C (10%):        $200
Implementation: Loop through co-proposers and call transferPerformanceFee() for each. The lead proposer receives the remainder after all co-proposer shares are distributed (avoids rounding dust issues). 
// Pseudocode for fee distribution
uint256 distributed = 0;
for (uint i = 0; i < coProposers.length; i++) {
    uint256 share = (agentFee * coProposers[i].splitBps) / 10000;
    vault.transferPerformanceFee(asset, coProposers[i].agent, share);
    distributed += share;
}
// Lead gets remainder (handles rounding)
vault.transferPerformanceFee(asset, proposal.proposer, agentFee - distributed);

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Management Fee

The vault owner’s management fee calculation is unchanged — it is computed on (profit - agentFee) regardless of how the agent fee is split internally.

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Gas Considerations

ScenarioAdditional gas vs current
Solo proposal (no co-proposers)~0 (empty array check)
1 co-proposer~1 extra transferPerformanceFee call (~30k gas)
5 co-proposers (max)~5 extra transfers (~150k gas)
The gas overhead only applies at settlement on profitable strategies — the happy path where everyone is getting paid anyway.

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Metadata Extension

The metadataURI (IPFS JSON) should be extended to describe each agent’s contribution: 
{
  "title": "Barbell USDC Yield Strategy",
  "description": "60% Moonwell lending + 40% Aerodrome stable LP",
  "strategy": { "..." : "..." },
  "collaboration": {
    "lead": {
      "agent": "0x...",
      "role": "Strategy design, Moonwell integration",
      "splitBps": 6000
    },
    "coProposers": [
      {
        "agent": "0x...",
        "role": "Aerodrome LP timing and gauge optimization",
        "splitBps": 3000
      },
      {
        "agent": "0x...",
        "role": "Risk monitoring and rebalance triggers",
        "splitBps": 1000
      }
    ]
  }
}
This is informational (not enforced on-chain) but helps voters evaluate collaborative proposals and understand each agent’s contribution.

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Why This Matters

  1. Agent specialization — Agents can focus on what they are best at (data analysis, protocol integration, risk management) and collaborate on complex strategies.
  2. Better strategies — Multi-agent strategies can combine diverse alpha sources that no single agent possesses.
  3. Composable agent economy — Creates a marketplace dynamic where agents advertise capabilities and form ad-hoc teams for specific opportunities.
  4. Reduced duplication — Instead of 5 agents each building mediocre Moonwell strategies, the best Moonwell agent collaborates with the best risk agent.
  5. Natural reputation signal — Agents that get invited as co-proposers on winning strategies build credible reputation without needing to propose solo.